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In this paper we study the effect of parental leave on individual careers.  We use 
individual registration data of a Dutch non-profit firm (Utrecht University). Our 
outcomes show that even with a short period of flexible leave there are career 
effects. More specifically, these effects are not unambiguously positive: slightly 
longer job durations are found, but also a lower probability of wage increases. It also 
appears that there are differences in effects between men and women: for men the 
effects appear to be smaller and of a more temporary character than for women. 
Apparently, even in a highly flexible system as the Dutch, with a high take up rate of 
men, the labour-care balance is still not gender neutral and not career neutral 
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1  Introduction 
In most countries, leave facilities are an important element of  reconciliation policy. 
Especially when children are young, time related provisions such a leave entitlements, 
career  breaks  and  the  reductions  of  working  hours  are  extremely  important  for 
combining  work  and  private  life.  Yet,  although  leave  facilities  are  an  important 
reconciliation measure, the labour market outcomes may be rather negative, especially 
if the leave is long. In addition, the gender effects may be rather negative as leave is 
mostly taken up by women. For Germany, for example, Beblo et al. (2006) found a 
substantial decrease of 21% for in wages for women who take parental leave. Using 
data from the Nordic countries, Datta Gupta et al. (2008) found negative effects from 
the  presence  of  long-time  parental  leave  legislation  on  wages  and  consequently  for 
career  opportunities  of  women.  Other  studies  argue  that  the  actual  effects  of  leave 
depend on the design of the entitlement. Bruning and Plantenga (1999) for example 
state that the emancipatory content of leave regulation depends on the relationship with 
the labour market which is expressed by the regulation, the share of men among the 
average number of leave takers and the percentage of (female) leave takers who return 
to the labour market after the leave period. In addition, Ruhm (1998) and Jaumotte 
(2003) suggest that both shorter and longer period of leave result in lower participation 
rate or in lower wages. In effect, the optimal duration of maternity and parental leave 
seem to be around four to six month in total. 
 If there is indeed such an optimal design of leave in terms of labour market 
effects, the Dutch legislation should be rated rather positively as parents are entitled to a 
relatively short period of parental leave. Since 1997, the total number of leave hours is 
set at 13 times the number of the contractual weekly working hours. The statutory right   3 
is part-time: parents have the legal right to lower their working hours by 50% over a 
period of 26 weeks. However, employees may request the employer to spread the leave 
hours over a longer period than six months or to take more leave hours per week. As a 
result the actual duration of parental leave may range from 3 month on a full-time basis 
to 15 month when leave is taken for only one day a week. 
The flexible and decentralized design of the Dutch parental leave legislation also 
implies that the take up of men is rather high. In fact, in 2008 17.9% of the eligible men 
and 37.0% of the eligible women took up parental leave. For men the average duration 
of the leave was 13 month for 8 hours per week, whereas women took on average 10 
month leave for 11 hour a week. As a result, more than a third of all leave hours are 
taken up by men. This percentage is significantly higher than in other countries. Even in 
Sweden, where the take up of men is high, the duration of the leave between men and 
women is very different, as result of which less than 20% of all leave hours are taken up 
by  men  (Deven  &  Moss,  2005).  This  specific  Dutch  situation  makes  it  possible  to 
compare the labour market effects of male and female leave takers. Whereas most other 
research focuses on female leave takers and compares their career patterns with (male or 
female) non-leave takers, the Dutch case provides the unique opportunity to analyse 
whether taking up parental leave has a different impact on the labour market career of 
fathers and mothers.  
As detailed representative data for the Netherlands are not available, we will 
assess career effects of taking up leave by analysing the personnel data from Utrecht 
University in The Netherlands over the period January 2002 till December 2009. These 
data  allow  for  a  detailed  study  on  the  take  up  of  leave  and  the  career  path  of  the 
employees during these eight years. An important advantage of the focus on one single   4 
employer is that this solves the sorting effect. Some authors point out that employees 
who plan to have children tend to pre-sort into sectors where parental leave regulations 
exists (Beblo et al., 2006), thereby influencing the labour market effects. One way of 
avoiding the sorting effect is to use data from a homogeneous group which makes it 
easier to single out the  effect of the leave itself: in case two otherwise comparable 
workers within the same firm show any differences in career paths it is more likely that 
leave is the cause of this difference. 
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section 2 there is a short review of 
the literature and of  earlier results.  In Section 3 we briefly introduce the system of 
parental  leave  in  the  Netherlands,  and,  more  specifically,  at  Utrecht  University.  In 
Section 4 we introduce our data. In Section 5 we present a descriptive analysis, followed 
by a more formal empirical analysis in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2  Theory and earlier results 
In recent years a number of studies have been published on the impact of leave on future 
labour market outcomes. Most of these studies do not focus on career effect of taking up 
leave, but record labour market outcomes in terms of participation rates and wages.  
Two  mechanisms  responsible  for  the  effects  on  labour  market  outcomes  are  put 
forward. The first one applies a straight-forward human capital argument and predicts 
negative effects of leave: leave results in a period out of work, which in turn leads to 
depreciation of human capital and a loss of (potential) work-experience. The second one 
can be interpreted as a kind of transaction cost argument and predicts positive results:   5 
parental  leave  facilitates  the  return  to  the  labour  market  after  a  period  of  non-
participation due to lower search costs.  
Most empirical studies on the effect of leave on careers start from the human 
capital argument. Rönsen and Sundström (1996) use cross-sectional data on Sweden and 
Norway, which allow for a comparison between countries and cohorts. Ondrich et al. 
(1996; 2002) use individual panel data on Germany, which allow for the observation of 
full careers. These studies show that interruptions tend to loosen the tie with the labour 
market, and therefore decrease the possibility of participation in later life. They also 
show that individuals tend to take full advantage of the institutional system and use the 
maximum period of leave allowed. Ziefle (2004) reaches comparable conclusions with 
respect to wages: an increase in the duration of leave leads to a larger loss of human 
capital and therefore to a larger loss in terms of wages and job-security. There is little 
research on the labour market effects of leave on the Dutch labour market, yet Román 
(2006) presents a comparative study of the effects of ‘career detours’ based on Dutch 
and Belgian panel data. She shows that there are negative and lasting effects of career 
interruptions  as  well  as  of  part-time  work.  Yet,  the  institutionalised  Belgium  career 
break system does not seem to harm women’s careers: the effects on wages appear 
negligible. 
The studies above tend to use ‘not interrupting’ as the default: any interruption 
in the form of leave tends to result in a loss of human capital and in lower return rates. 
However, if the default is ‘quitting the labour market’ a leave facility might in fact have 
a positive effect on future careers, as leave allows employees to get some time off, and 
still maintain a fairly strong tie to the labour market. Apart from paying attention to the 
human capital argument, Rönsen and Sundström (1996) also (implicitly) refer to the   6 
transaction cost argument. Using data on Sweden and Norway, they find that women 
interrupting their career by means of formal leave arrangements actually have a much 
higher rate of return than women that do not use any leave arrangement and quit their 
job. This can be explained by the fact that women taking leave have a job to return to, in 
contrast to women who have quit their job. These results are confirmed also in larger 
international comparative studies of Mandel and Semyonov (2005; 2006) who find that 
countries  with  family  friendly  policies  in  general  tend  to  have  higher  female 
participation  rates,  although  the  results  with  respect  to  the  male-female  wage 
differentials are negative. Also the study of Hashimoto et al. (2004) based on US data 
shows that in the US parental leave does not harm careers of workers, mainly due to the 
fact that the negative effect on human capital is too small to outweigh the positive effect 
of remaining linked to the labour market. The same conclusions are reached by Joesch 
(1997) and Waldfogel et al. (1999) who find that the positive effects of leave are mainly 
caused by the fact that workers remain at their pre-birth employer.  
Neither the human capital nor the transaction costs argument is gender sensitive. 
Yet,  there  are  indications  that  taking  up  leave  has  a  different  impact  on  the  labour 
market career of men than of women. Beblo and Wolf (2002), for example, on the basis 
of a large dataset from IAB (Germany) conclude that all interruptions are costly in terms 
of wages, but that the costs differ between men and women and between various types 
of interruptions. The costs of interruption due to parental leave, for example, tend to be 
higher than one due to unemployment. These results seem to be in line with earlier 
results of Albrecht et al. (1999) on the wage effects of interruptions in Sweden. Their 
results indicate that the effects of interruptions are stronger for men than for women. In 
addition, the effects of various types of career interruption differ: parental leave has   7 
strong effects on wages, while unemployment has smaller effects. The authors conclude 
that these results cast some doubt on the human capital explanation of wages: the results 
can more easily be interpreted as proof of sorting and signalling in the labour market. 
Most of the above cited literature uses representative samples of micro data to 
analyse the effects of leave in terms of participation and/or the wage gap.  In addition, 
they compare the labour market behaviour of (female) leave takers with (male) non 
leave takers. Unfortunately this is not a feasible research strategy in the Dutch case as 
detailed representative data are not available. Instead we focus on the career effects of 
taking up leave at the level of the firm. By studying the impact of parental leave on the 
exit options and the possibility of a wage increase at one particular employer, we will be 
able to analyse whether even in the case of the Netherlands, which has a flexible, part-
time leave as the standard option, there are differences in mobility patterns and wage 
prospects between leave takers and non leave takers and between men and women. 
 
3  Parental leave in the Netherlands 
In  The  Netherlands  the  Act  on  Parental  leave  was  introduced  in  1991.  After  a 
reorganisation in 1997, the total number of leave hours was set at 13 times the number 
of the contractual weekly working hours. The statutory right is unpaid and part-time: 
parents have the legal right to lower their working hours by 50% over a period of 26 
weeks. However, employees may request the employer to spread the leave hours over a 
longer period than six months or to take more leave hours per week. The leave can be 
taken until the child is eight years old. In 2001, with the introduction of the new Work 
and Care Act the possibility to take leave became even more  flexible as it became   8 
possible to take leave in more than one period. In 2008, 37% of the eligible women and 
17.9% of eligible men took up parental leave. Recently the parental leave legislation has 
been changed; by the first of January, 2009, the length of the parental leave is now 
settled at 26 weeks. The statutory right is still unpaid, but a fiscal facility of 50% of the 
minimum wage is, by the same date, granted for all employees taking up parental leave. 
   From  the  very  start,  the  employer  has  been  given  an  important  role  in  the 
introduction  of  leave  facilities  within  the  Dutch  working  time  regime.  By  way  of 
collective labour agreements, the social partners are supposed to top up public policy 
which  is  mainly  concerned  with  guaranteeing  the  minimum  right.  Indeed,  Utrecht 
University has a (firm-specific) system of parental leave that is more flexible and better 
paid than the legal minimum. During the period covered by our study, there has been 
one major change, which took place in January 2007. Until 2007, in principle, there 
were two ‘basic’ models for the leave: 
−  A  maximum  of  50%  of  the  contract  hours  of  the  employment  during  an 
uninterrupted period of a maximum of 4 months, with a continued payment of 
75% of the leave hours; or 
−  A  maximum  of  50%  of  the  contract  hours  of  the  employment  during  an 
uninterrupted period of a maximum of 6 months, with a continued payment of 
50% of the leave hours. 
In addition to this standard model, leave can be taken in almost any combination of 
weekly hours and income level as long as the total amount equals 1.5 month of salary. 
In Table 1 a number of examples is given, but in practice far more combinations are 
used,  depending  on  the  individual  situation.  For  these  other  combinations  explicit 
faculty management approval is needed.    9 
In  2007  there  has  been  a  major  revision  of  the  system.  From  January  2007 
onwards the number of leave hours was specified to be 13 times the weekly working 
hours (thus matching University regulations to Dutch law). It is still allowed to take 
leave in a flexible way as long as the total number of leave hours does not exceed 13 
times the weekly working hours. The payment is no longer dependent on the length of 
the leave period: the payment of the leave hours is 62.5% of the normal gross hourly 
wage rate. Since January 2007, it is therefore no longer possible to trade a shorter period 
of leave against a higher level of payment (or vice versa) as was possible in the system 
before 2007. The system has thus lost some of its flexibility, and became less generous.  
 
Table 1 
Parental leave arrangements at Utrecht University, until 2007 
Continued payment of 75% of leave hours   Continued payment of 50% of leave hours 
Leave Term  
  
 Extent of leave  
 in % of working time  
 Leave Term  
  
 Extent of leave  
 in % of working time 
 2 months    100%    3 months    100% 
 3.3 months    60%    5 months    60% 
 4 months    50%    6 months    50% 
 5 months    40%    7.5 months    40% 
 8 months    25%    12 months    25% 
10 months    20%    15 months    20% 
Source: Regeling Universitaire arbeidsvoorwaarden, various issues: 1999-2006 
 
 
4  Data 
The data for this study come from the salary records of Utrecht University. From the 
year 2002 onwards the university uses a centralized system, in which a large number of 
details are registered regarding tenure, salary, working time and some other aspects (one 
of  which  being  leave).  As  the  system  was  not  introduced  at  the  same  time  in  all   10 
faculties, some faculties are not in the data from 2002, but only from 2003 onwards. Our 
data run up to December 2009. 
  Given the fact that the data are administrative data used for the salary payments, 
only aspects that are relevant to the payment of wages are registered. So, information 
with respect to educational level, household situation etc. is not recorded in the system. 
Also the number of children is not known. For women we know if a birth occurs in the 
period she is working at the university, as this is relevant information with respect to 
maternity leave and payment of wages. For men, birth of a child is not registered as this 
is not needed for administrative procedures. Therefore, we can relate birth and parental 
leave  for mothers, but  not for fathers.  Also, we can observe employees leaving the 
university,  but  we  do  not  know  where  and  why  they  are  going.  It  is  therefore  not 
possible to differentiate between employees who stop working altogether, and those 
who change employers. A similar situation arises for the new employees: we register a 
new employee starting to work, but we have no information on prior work experience. 
  With  respect  to  parental  leave,  information  regarding  timing,  length  and 
intensity of the leave are registered. In total there are 1,487 recorded spells of parental 
leave over the period 2002-2009. Table 2 shows how the use of parental leave at Utrecht 
University evolves over time. As some employees have more than one period of leave 
(either due to multiple children, or as a result of splitting leave into multiple periods), 
the total number of employees involved is less than the number of leave spells: 363 men 
and 594 women, most of which have one or two periods of leave. 
 
 
   11 
Table 2 
Number registered periods of leave at Utrecht University by starting year (male and female employees) 
Year   Men  Women  Total 
2000
a)  0  3  3 
2001  39  41  80 
2002  58  91  149 
2003  81  98  179 
2004  61  102  163 
2005  87  123  210 
2006  73  142  215 
2007  38  77  115 
2008  52  122  174 
2009  66  133  199 
 Total   555  932  1,487 
a) Note that the spells beginning in 2000 and 2001 are only recorded as long as they have not yet ended 
by  January  1
st  2002.  Spells  ending  before  January  2002  were  not  recorded.  The  numbers  therefore 
underestimate the total leave taken in these years.  
Source: Salary records Utrecht University, 2002-2009 
 
Table 3 shows that employees take ample opportunity of the flexible leave regulation. 
Most men choose for a leave that is relatively small in terms of hours per week, but 
covers a longer period: almost 62% of the male leave takers do so for maximum 20% of 
their weekly working hours, and more than 70% takes leave for a period longer than 6 
months.  For  female  employees,  the  pattern  is  more  diverse:  compared  to  men  less 
women limit their leave to one day a week although the proportion that does is still 
considerable (36.6%). A relatively high percentage of women take leave for 20-40% of 
their weekly working hours, and almost 14% of the women involved chose to have a 
full-time leave. When we compute leave in terms of actual days taken, the difference 
between men and women is very small: women take on average 51 days over a nine-
month period, while men take 50 days over a ten and a half month period. All in all in 
can be calculated that approximately 40% of the leave days is taken up by men. This 
percentage  seems  to  be  in  line  with  the  evidence  of  other  Dutch  public  sector 
companies.  




Choices made with respect to extent and length of the parental leave, in percentages of total number of 
leave periods (male and female employees) 
 Men    
   extent of leave in percentage of weekly working hours 
Length   0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100%  Total 
0-<=3 months   1.6  2.2  2.0  1.1  7.7  14.6 
3-<=6 months   4.0  3.8  4.3  0.5  0.2  12.8 
6-<=12 months   24.9  13.7  0.5  0.2  0.0  39.3 
12-<=15 months   22.3  1.3  0.4  0.0  0.0  24.0 
more than 15 months   8.8  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.4 
             
Total   61.6  21.4  7.2  1.8  7.9  100.0 
              
Women              
   extent of leave in percentage of weekly working hours 
Length  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100%  Total 
0-<=3 months   0.9  2.5  1.9  0.2  13.1  18.6 
3-<=6 months   2.9  7.8  6.1  0.6  0.5  18.0 
6-<=12 months   12.4  25.4  1.1  0.2  0.0  39.2 
12-<=15 months   12.9  2.4  0.2  0.2  0.1  15.8 
more than 15 months   7.5  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  8.5 
             
Total   36.6  39.1  9.3  1.3  13.7  100.0 
 Source: Salary records Utrecht University, 2002-2009 
 
 
5  Descriptive analyses 
Before going into more detailed analyses, in this Section some descriptive tables on the 
relation between leave and career outcomes are presented. In the literature, the impact 
of  leave  is  mostly  calculated  in  terms  of  participation  rates  and  relative  wages. 
Translated to the level of the firm, we are especially interested in the impact of taking 
up leave on the individual careers of men and women. More in particular we have   13 
calculated  the  exit  probability,  the  working  hour  changes  and  the  probability  of 
receiving a more than regular wage increase by gender and taking up parental leave.  
  
Table 4 
Exit probability and working hour changes over 1 year, by gender and parental leave taking at Utrecht 
University, in percentages 








  Total  Number of 
Observations 
 Men    No   11.0  2.8  83.7  2.5    100  25,550 
    Yes   7.3  7.9  83.2  1.6    100  758 
    Total   10.9  2.9  83.7  2.5    100  26,308 
 Women    No   12.8  5.5  75.8  5.9    100  20,955 
    Yes   5.8  17.5  74.3  2.5    100  1,140 
   Total   12.4  6.1  75.7  5.7    100  22,095 
 Total     11.6  4.4  80.0  4.0    100  48,403 
Source: Salary record Utrecht University, 2002-2009 
 
As a first indication, Table 4 shows the percentage of employees that left university and 
those that experienced a change in working hours, based on (pooled) transition data. 
Over the period of a year, 11.6% of the employees leave their job. There is a difference 
between  men  and  women:  10.9%  of  the  men  have  left,  compared  to  12.4%  of  the 
women. Of those employees who took a period of leave recently, a considerable lower 
percentage leaves their job: only 7.3% of the men and 5.8% of the women. Next to the 
exit-mobility,  the  Table  reveals  a  lot  of  hours-flexibility.  On  average,  4.4%  of  the 
employees reduce working hours, and 4.0% of the employees increase their working 
hours. Again, there is a difference between men and women: amongst men only 2.9% 
reduce  working  hours,  while  amongst  women  this  percentage  is  6.1%.  Also  the 
percentage of employees increasing working hours is larger amongst women: 5.7% of 
the women compared to 2.5% of the men. Taking up leave seems to be a relevant issue 
is  this  respect:  amongst  workers  who  took  leave  the  percentage  of  employees  who   14 
lowered working hours is relatively high: 7.9% amongst men compared to 2.9% for the 









  No increase 











 Men    No     40.4  40.1  8.5  11.0  100  25,550 
    Yes     26.8  54.6  11.3  7.3  100  758 
    Total    40.0  40.5  8.6  10.9  100  26,308 
 
Women  No     31.5  45.0  10.7  12.8  100  20,955 
    Yes     25.0  58.2  11.1  5.8  100  1,140 
    Total   31.2  45.7  10.7  12.4  100  22,095 
 
Total       36.0  42.9  9.5  11.6  100  48,403 
Source: salary records Utrecht University, 2002-2009 
 
Table 5 indicates the transitions in terms of wage changes. Over a period of one year, 
workers normally receive their yearly wage increase, unless they are at the end of their 
salary scale. So the deviations from this standard are the more interesting transitions. It 
can be seen that the majority of the university employees is either at the end of the 
salary scale (36.0%), or does receive the standard yearly wage increase (42.9%). There 
is  a  slight  difference  between  men  and  women  in  these  percentages,  which  can 
presumably be explained from the -on average- longer tenure of the men. On average, 
9.5% of the employees receive a more than the regular wage increase, 8.6% of the male 
employees and 10.7% of the female employees. Amongst the men, there is also a slight 
difference between the employees that did take leave, and those who did not: in the first 
group 11.3% received an increase, and in the other group 8.5% did. The difference in 
the  group  of  female  employees,  although  pointing  in  the  same  direction,  is  almost 
absent.   15 
The  information  in  the  Tables  suggests  some  (gender  specific)  correlation 
between leave-taking and working career. As descriptive tables might be misleading 
with respect to the actual size of the correlations, in the next Section we will estimate 
two explanatory models, one for the exit probability (by means of a Cox-regression) and 
one for the probability of a wage increase (by means of a fixed effect logit model). In 
both models one of the key explanatory factors is the take-up of parental leave by men 
and women. 
 
6  Estimation results 
To  estimate  the  effect  of  leave  taking  on  the  exit-probability  we  will  use  a  Cox 
proportional hazard model, in which we relate the exit probability to the fact whether or 
not an individual is on leave, or has experienced a period of leave. Using this model we 
take full account of the structure of the data. To estimate the probability of a wage 
increase, we do not use a duration model, as the event does not need to happen, or can 
happen more than once. In this case a panel data logit model is more appropriate. As 
both leave and career are possibly influenced by common factors not included in the 
model (such as number and age of children or individual preferences towards a labour 
career) we will use fixed effect models in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
effect of parental leave.  
In both models we excluded professors as there seemed to be quite a lot of a-
typical appointments in this group (very small appointments, appointments with very 
short durations, interrupted appointments after the legal retirement age, etc.). As there 
was virtually no leave taking in this group, the impact of the decision is likely to be very   16 
small. We also excluded the group of PhD-students (who in the Dutch context have a 
formal labour contract with the University). The career of PhD–students is very much 
dictated by institutional regulations, and as such does not contain any information with 
respect to the effects of leave taking (or any other explanatory factors). As a result, we 
concentrate on non scientific and scientific staff. 
 
Exit probability 
In  order  to  solve  the  problem  of  left-censoring,  we  exclude  for  the  Cox  model  all 
workers that entered the university before the registration in our data starts. Notice that 
part of the group excluded, did in fact take a period of leave. However, excluding this 
left-censored group is necessary to get a proper estimate of the baseline hazard. We also 
exclude workers that entered university at ages over 55, as a relatively large number of 
non-standard contracts are amongst them. As we are primarily interested in the effects 
of taking parental leave, we have included a time varying dummy variable indicating 
whether  or  not  parental leave  occurred.  Age  at  entrance  in  the  job  and  job  type  at 
entrance are added as additional explanatory variables. Although it can not be ruled out 
that interaction effects exist, the number of observations was such that the estimation 
with interaction effects did not lead to acceptable outcomes.  
In Table 6 we present the estimation results with respect to the probability of 
leaving the university. The results shown are the proportional hazards, i.e. the factor by 
which the baseline hazard is multiplied, so estimates below 1 indicate a decrease in the 
exit probability (relative to the baseline hazard), while estimates above 1 increase the 
exit-probability (relative to the baseline hazard). Not shown here are the plots of the 
baseline hazard, which essentially go down with the length of the tenure. In the first   17 
column, we show the estimated parameters for the total group of employees. In the first 
line of the Table the effect of being on leave is shown. It turns out that being on leave 
reduces the probability of leaving the university considerably. The estimated hazard rate 
is 0.373, indicating that during the period of leave the exit probability is only one third 
the baseline exit rate. This is a considerable reduction in exit rates in the short run. 
There is, however, no effect of leave in the past: the estimated hazard rate does not 
differ significantly from 1, indicating no change in the exit probability as a result of 
leave taking in the past. Taken together, it seems that in the short run parental leave has 
a positive effect on the job-tie of a worker. This effect is only for the duration of the 
period of leave. Although there is some suggestion of the effect lasting after the period 
of leave has ended, this effect is not significant. Thus, the total effect of parental leave 
taking on the exit probability is relatively small. The exit-probability is far stronger 
influenced by the two control variables age and job-type. Employees that are older when 
they start working at the university have lower exit-probabilities: exit probabilities drop 
4% at each year of age. The exit rates of scientific staff are well above the exit rates of 
non-scientific staff.  
Separate estimation of the model for men and women indicate that the effect of 
leave  is  very  strong  for  women,  for  who  almost  no  quitting  is  observed  during  or 
directly following a period of leave; being on leave lowers the exit-probability by 73%. 
For men the effect is smaller and not significant. A formal likelihood-ratio test on the 
equality  of  the  two  models  for  men  and  women  shows  that  the  difference  is  non-
significant, which leads us to the conclusion that the effect of leave for men and women   18 
on the exit probability is equal.
1 This is mainly explained by the fact that the estimated 
effect of leave for the men has a rather large standard error. 
 
Table 6 
Estimation results (hazard rates) of Cox-proportional hazard model of exit-probabilities 
   Total
a)  Women  Men 
Leave going on    0.373***    0.267***     0.543 
     (0.12)     (0.13)    (0.24) 
Leave in the past    0.916    0.872     0.983 
     (0.14)    (0.16)    (0.24) 
Age at entrance    0.959***     0.957***    0.962*** 
     (0.00)     (0.003)    (0.003) 
Scientific staff    1.321***    1.290***     1.366*** 
     (0.04)    (0.05)    (0.07) 
Number of individuals  7,106  4,062  3,044 
Number of failures (exits)  4,194  2,422  1,772 
Log likelihood   -31,640.6  -18,562.8  -13,076.10 
Model significance  χ
2 (4) = 440.7***  χ
2 (4) = 271.8***  χ
2 (4) = 172.3*** 
Standard errors in parentheses, significance levels given for the hypothesis that the hazard rate equals 1. 
a) The total model is stratified by gender to allow for differences in the baseline hazard. 
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Source: Salary records Utrecht University, 2002-2009 
 
 
Wage increase  
The model for the wage increase is estimated using a fixed effect logit model. A wage 
increase in this model is defined as a higher than the normal wage increase. Both ‘no 
change’ and the ‘regular yearly increase’ are combined into the reference category. Due 
to using a different econometric specification, the selection of the sample differs from 
the one used for the model for the exit probability. For the fixed effects logit model we 
exclude all workers aged over 50, to make sure that we are not modelling the retirement 
                                                 
1 The likelihood ratio statistic is calculated as 2*((13,076.1+18,562.8) – 31,640.6) = 3.34, which has a χ
2 
–distribution  with 4 degrees  of freedom. Note that the  models are nested due to the gender specific 
baseline hazard in the combined model.   19 
process. In doing so, we exclude a small number of individuals (mainly men) taking 
parental leave. Because the estimation of a fixed effects logit needs at least one positive 
outcome,  all  employees  that  never  received  a  more  than  regular  wage  increase  are 
excluded from our sample. We use dummies to indicate whether or not parental leave 
has been taken in the previous year or the years prior to that. As additional explanatory 
variables  we  use  tenure  and  dummies  that  indicate  whether  individuals  are  on  a 
permanent contract, and whether they are still eligible for the standard  yearly  wage 
increase.  Tenure  is  included  both  linear  and  quadratic  to  account  for  the  fact  that 
mobility might decrease over the life course. We also included a variable indicating the 
weekly working hours. Job type can not be included, as there are virtually no changes in 
this variable within individuals over time. 
As can be seen in the first column of Table 7, leave has a small but significant 
effect on the wage development of employees in the short run. Leave taken two or three 
years ago has no significant effect on wage increases. The explanation of the decrease in 
the  probability  of  a  wage  increase  may  be  that  although  leave  ensures  a  tie  to  the 
employer, for a more than a minimal wage increase some additional effort is needed. 
Taking  leave  apparently  prohibits  this  additional  effort,  and  therefore  decreases  the 
probability of receiving a wage increase, even if the leave is relatively short, or is taken 
up in part-time. Notice however, that on average leave takers to be on lower wage levels 
in the remainder of their career, as they faced a lower probability of a wage increase. 
This finding suggests that even in a rather regulated system, we find support for the 
findings in other studies that periods of leave tend to have a negative effect on future 
wages, both in levels and in growth.   20 
Again, we test for the equality of the effects of taking leave for men and women. 
In the second column of the Table, we show a model on pooled data, in which we allow 
for some parameters to be gender specific. In this specification we can see that there are 
some differences between men and women. Especially the effect of leave taken in the 
past differs between men and women: for women, the probability of a wage increase if 
leave has been taken three years ago is significantly smaller than for men. This suggests 
that effects for women tend to be longer lasting, while for men there is a catching-up in 
the years after leave has been taken. This lasting negative effect for women might be 
related to the shift between work and family life that take place in women’s careers, 
although we corrected for the fact that a reduction in working hours also negatively 
influences wage development. This finding is in contrast with earlier results by e.g. 
Albrecht et al. (1999) and Beblo and Wolf (2002) who found that wage effects tend to 
be much stronger for men than for women. The only other effect that is gender-specific 
is the effect of being at the end of some ones wage scale: it seems as if men have higher 
probability of getting promoted into the next scale than women. 
For reference, we also included in column three and four of the Table the models 
in which all effects are assumed to be gender specific. From a formal test, it follows that 
this specification is rejected against the specification in the second column. It can be 
seen in these columns, however, that the difference in the effects of leave in the past is 
large: for men it is positive and non-significant, for women it is negative and significant. 
For women, the effect of leave in the past is even stronger than the effects of leave last 
year. 
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Table 7 
Estimation results of a conditional fixed effect logit model to explain wage mobility at Utrecht University 
   Total  Men  Women 
  




Leave last year  -0.186*  -0.183*  -0.141  -0.206 
   (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.13) 
Leave two years ago  0.051  0.305  0.320  -0.098 
   (0.13)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.17) 
Leave two years ago*female    -0.400     
    (0.25)     
Leave three years ago  -0.123  0.298  0.299  -0.376* 
   (0.15)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.20) 
Leave three years ago*female    -0.684**     
    (0.29)     
Tenure   -0.148***  -0.146***  -0.135***  -0.154*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Tenure
2/100   -0.415***  -0.424***  -0.415**  -0.452** 
   (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.17)  (0.18) 
Permanent contract   -0.621***  -0.625***  -0.677***  -0.582*** 
   (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.11) 
 End of scale  1.150***  1.309***  1.303***  1.005*** 
   (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10) 
End of scale*female    -0.309**     
    (0.14)     
Part-time percentage (1-100%)   -0.038***  -0.038***  -0.039***  -0.037*** 
   (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Number of observations   14,317  14,317  6,855  7,462 
Number of individuals   2,504  2,504  1,197  1,307 
Log likelihood   -4,231.4  -4,225.4  -2012.8  -2211.9 
Log likelihood (const.only)   -5,182.5  -5,182.5  -2477.7  -2704.8 











2 (8) = 
985.8*** 
Pseudo R
2   0.184  0.185  0.188  0.182 
Standard errors in parentheses, *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 




7  Conclusions 
From an equal opportunities point of view, the Dutch parental leave legislation scores 
rather high. There is a flexible system of parental leave that has relative short periods of 
part-time leave as the standard option. In addition, men take a substantial part of the 
total  leave.  The  literature  suggests  that  in  this  situation  we  should  find  only  little   22 
negative effects of leave on individual careers. Using personnel registration data from a 
Dutch university we show that during a period of leave there is a significant decrease in 
the exit-probability. However, after the period  of leave ends, there is  no significant 
difference in exit rates between leave takers and non-leave takers. In addition, taking 
leave lowers the probability of a more than regular wage increase. For men this is a 
temporary negative  effect on  growth,  for female employees the probability of wage 
growth is negatively affected by leave that has been taken longer ago.  
Based on our outcomes, we conclude that taking up leave delays mobility and 
has a negative effect on wages. Although the negative effects on wage growth are small, 
especially the fact that for women they remain visible over longer periods does indicate 
that even in a highly flexible system as the Dutch, with a high take up rate of men, the 
labour-care balance is still not gender neutral and not career neutral. This raises again 
the issue of the optimal design of parental leave, making it more compatible with paid 
work and/or trying to facilitate equal sharing. Presumably there is no easy answer to this 
question. In fact, it seems likely that the care infrastructure can only to a certain extent 
be ‘employment led’. Whereas fiscal policy and social security policy become more and 
more targeted towards increasing the employment rate of both men and women, care 
policies are (also) motivated by different issues, like the fertility rate, family vales and 
child  well  being.  Although  policies  in  these  areas  may  not  by  definition  contradict 
labour market considerations, the Dutch case illustrates that some trade-offs are likely to 
exist between facilitating care and stimulating equal opportunities.   23 
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